




Price effects of sovereign debt auctions in the Euro-zone
Beetsma, R.M.W.J.; Giuliodori, M.; de Jong, F.C.J.M.; Widijanto, D.
Published in:







Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Beetsma, R. M. W. J., Giuliodori, M., de Jong, F. C. J. M., & Widijanto, D. (2016). Price effects of sovereign debt
auctions in the Euro-zone: The role of the crisis . Journal of Financial Intermediation, 25, 30-53.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2014.11.004
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 12. May. 2021
Price Effects of Sovereign Debt Auctions in the Euro-zone: 
The Role of the Crisis* 
 




We show that new public debt issues cause an auction cycle for Italian secondary-market 
debt, but not for German debt. The cycle is mainly observed for the crisis period since mid-
2007 and is larger when the crisis, as measured by yield volatility and CDS spreads of 
primary dealers, is more intense. Volatility seems to be the main driving factor. The cycle is 
also present in secondary-market series with maturities close to the auctioned series. Our 
findings are consistent with the theory of primary dealers’ limited risk-bearing capacity. There 
is also weak evidence of spill-overs from foreign auctions to domestic markets. 
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Auctions are important events in the treasury bond market. As their timing and size are 
typically known several days in advance, in an efficient market one would expect no 
predictable bond price or yield movements around auctions.1 Nevertheless, recent empirical 
research documents the existence of an ‘auction cycle’ in the U.S. treasury bond market, in 
which bond yields show an inverted V-shaped pattern around the auction dates.2 That is, bond 
yields rise in the run-up to the auction and fall back to their original level after the auction. 
In this paper, we offer new evidence on the existence of an auction cycle in secondary 
markets for public debt and explore specifically the impact of the economic and financial 
crisis on the magnitude of the auction cycle. We focus on two countries, Germany and Italy, 
with large economies and substantial amounts of public debt outstanding.3 Hence, these 
countries have public debt markets that are among the most liquid and active of the euro-zone. 
However, they have been affected in substantially different ways by the crisis, with German 
yields falling to unprecedentedly low levels and Italian yields rising to dangerously high 
levels. Moreover, the two countries generally feature different auctioning mechanisms and 
auctioning policies. We compare the auction cycle for the two countries during periods of 
different intensity of the crisis and find that the crisis has a strong effect on the Italian auction 
cycle, but essentially no effect on the German auction cycle.4 
We focus on a particular theoretical explanation for the existence of the auction cycle, 
namely the inventory management operations of the primary dealers. This theory has a 
number of testable predictions specifically related to the crisis. A first prediction is that if the 
crisis intensifies as evidenced by higher market volatility, primary dealers will charge higher 
markups and we expect the auction cycle to be larger. A second prediction is that the auction 
cycle also becomes larger if, as a result of the crisis becoming more intense, the risk-bearing 
capacity of the primary dealers shrinks. Since primary dealers make the market in bonds of 
various maturities, a third prediction of the theory is that an auction also puts pressure on the 
yields of bonds with maturities close to the auctioned maturity. 
                                                 
1 Of course, the announcement of the auction outcome may move the market in so far as it is unexpected, see 
Fleming and Remolona (1997). 
2 See Fleming and Rosenberg (2007) and Lou, Yan and Zhang (2013). 
3 At the end of December 2012 the total Italian public debt was €1,990 billion (of which €1,640 billion of 
outstanding bonds), while the German public debt was €1,139 billion. 
4 However, German public debt markets are affected by the crisis in other ways, in particular by flight-to-safety 




Our results are strongly in line with these predictions. Secondary-market yields on 
Italian public debt increase in anticipation of a new debt auction and decrease after the 
auction, while there is little evidence of such an auction cycle for German public debt. 
Importantly, this difference in the behaviour of Italian and German secondary-market yields is 
only present between in the period of the crisis since mid-2007, which is in line with the 
strong adverse tensions in the Italian debt markets during the crisis, while no such tensions 
were observed for the German debt markets. We provide further testing of the crisis-related 
predictions of the theory by linking the size of the auction cycle to the yield volatility and the 
risk-bearing capacity of the primary dealers, as captured by an index of CDS spreads, in the 
relevant market. While for Germany we are unable to detect any link between an auction 
cycle and any of the two measures, for Italy we do find that an increase in market volatility or 
a reduction in risk-bearing capacity has a strong positive effect on the size of the auction 
cycle. While the Italian auction cycle ranges over an average of 13 – 17 basis points since 
mid-2007, depending on the maturity of the issued debt, there are moments when the auction 
cycle is far larger with estimated peaks of up to 80 – 130 basis points around the end of 2011.  
Alternative explanations of predictable price patterns around auctions have been put 
forward, such as the on/off-the-run effect, price effects of repo specialness and supply effects 
(see Section 2). All these theories predict price effects in anticipation of the auction, but little 
or no effect after the auction. Instead, we do find predictable patterns after auctions. We also 
find that the secondary-market behaviour of series for which there is no auction, but with a 
maturity close to that of the auctioned series, is very similar to the secondary-market 
behaviour of the auctioned series. This particular finding supports our theory of yield 
movements being driven by the behaviour of primary dealers with limited risk-bearing 
capacity over the other possible explanations.  
We present two practical applications of our analysis. First, for the issue of an Italian 
five-year bond we calculate for the sub-period since mid-2007 an auction-induced additional 
issuance cost of almost 11 million euros, while the additional annual cost associated with a 
complete roll-over of the outstanding debt amounts to almost 1.3 billion euros. This is a more-
than-10-fold increase of the corresponding numbers for the pre-crisis period. In a second 
application, we assess the profit opportunities of duration-hedged trading strategies in the debt 
whose maturity is auctioned. However, the negative Sharpe ratios suggest that it is not 




costs having increased substantially during the crisis. Even so, there may be timing 
opportunities for parties that for exogenous reasons have to trade. 
There exists only a limited literature on how public debt auctions affect secondary-
market yields. Fleming and Rosenberg (2007) document positive yield changes before U.S. 
treasury auctions and negative yield changes after the auctions. Closest to this paper is Lou, 
Yan and Zhang (2013), who document the existence of an auction cycle in the U.S. treasury 
bond market. Our paper complements and extends their work in several ways. First, we 
explore auction cycles for countries other than the U.S. Second, and most importantly, based 
on our theoretical framework we explicitly link the auction cycle to the influence and the 
intensity of the crisis. We do this by contrasting the evidence for Italy, which experienced 
severe debt-market tensions during the crisis, with that for Germany, as a flight-to-safety 
country; by contrasting for Italy the pre-crisis period and the crisis period; and by exploring 
how the auction cycle is affected by variations in market volatility and primary dealer risk-
bearing capacity. The results suggest that the change in market volatility is the main driving 
force in this regard. How the crisis affects the auction cycle is important, because it may 
inform policymakers about the costs associated with debt issuance during periods of 
heightened financial-market tensions and how they could limit these. Third, the fact that we 
have auctions data for two major European countries allows us to explore spill-overs from 
foreign auctions to domestic secondary debt markets. Motivated by general perceptions that 
contagion among financial markets intensifies during crises, we interact dummies of foreign 
auctions with indicators of crisis intensity. However, only limited evidence of spill-overs from 
foreign auction activity is found. Finally, we document differences in the German and Italian 
auction cycles, even after controlling for our indicators of the crisis intensity. We explore 
various policy and design implications of our analysis for debt auctions. In particular, we 
address the discretion to regulate the eventual supply at the auction. 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 contains a description 
of the auction processes, after which it provides a brief literature review and sets out the 
conceptual framework for our empirical analysis. Section 3 discusses the dataset, while 
Section 4 presents the results of an event study in the vein of Lou et al. (2013). Section 5 
contains the basic regression analysis and provides further testing of our theoretical 
framework, by linking the auction cycle to market volatility and the risk-bearing capacity of 
the primary dealers and exploring potential cross-border spill-overs of auctions. Section 6 




policy and design implications of our analysis. Finally, Section 7 concludes the main body of 
the paper. 
 
2. Auction mechanisms, conceptual framework and model 
 
2.1. Auction procedures for German and Italian public debt 
 
Detailed descriptions of the auction procedures for Germany and Italy can be found in AFME 
(2013). Here, we describe them briefly, while we provide more information in Appendix A. 
Both governments report the days on which public debt auctions take place in an annual 
issuance calendar, implying that auction dates are precisely known for quite some time in 
advance. The terms and conditions of each specific auction, including its size, are announced 
about a week before it actually takes place. Hence, generally they are in the information set 
for the event window we consider. 
Acting for the Federal Government, the German Finance Agency (GFA) auctions 
federal securities via the Bundesbank. Only members of the “Bund Issues Auction Group” (37 
members, according to AFME, 2013), which includes both domestic and foreign banks, can 
participate directly. For the maturities under consideration, Germany uses discriminatory-
price auctions, in which bids above the lowest accepted price are allotted in full at the 
submitted price, while bids below this lowest accepted price will not be considered. However, 
non-competitive bids are also possible and are allotted at the weighted average price of the 
accepted competitive bids. The auction results are published on the auction day, while the 
financial settlement and transfer of ownership of the allotted securities typically take place 
two days after the auction. 
The terms and conditions of auctions of Italian public debt, which are carried out by 
the Italian central bank, are published roughly one week before the auction. Only specific 
agents, the so-called “Authorized Dealers” (twenty, according to AFME, 2013, and almost a 
subset of Germany’s primary dealers), can submit bids. For the maturities we consider the 
Italian Treasury uses marginal-price auctions, also referred to as uniform-price auctions, in 
which all bidders pay the same price, the so-called marginal price. In order to compensate 




commission of 0.20% to 0.40% of the amount allotted. The settlement takes place two 
working days after the auction.5 
A potentially important difference between the German and Italian auctions is that the 
supply in German auctions after their announcement is variable, while that in Italian auctions 
was fixed until not too long ago. Concretely, the German Treasury reserves the right to reject 
all bids, to scale down bids quoting the lowest accepted price, and/or to scale down non-
competitive bids. Hence, a certain amount of the instrument may be retained for secondary 
market operations after the auction. Only since October 2008 for our 5- and 10-year series and 
since December 2011 for our 2-year series has Italy allowed itself discretion regarding the 
eventual supply (Italian Treasury, 2014a). 
 
2.2. Potential sources of yield effects of auctions 
 
As discussed above, most of the bonds in treasury auctions are bought by a relatively small 
number of primary dealers. Those primary dealers have limited risk-bearing capacity, for 
example because they are risk averse or their capital is costly. Consequently, they need to be 
compensated for their large position in the asset and the price risk they take on their inventory 
in the auction. This compensation comes in the form of higher auction yields from which the 
dealers generate trading profits (see Fleming and Rosenberg, 2007). If the dealers’ risk 
aversion or the price risk is larger, one may expect them to charge a higher yield at the 
auction. Due to hedging pressures, other bond series, and in particular those for which the 
returns are highly correlated with the return on the new series, will also see an increase in the 
yield. For equity markets, empirical evidence in support of the inventory theory has been 
found by Hansch et al. (1998) and Hendershott and Menkveld (2014). These papers detect 
significant price pressures from dealers’ inventories. They also document that inventories are 
mean reverting with a half-life of one to two-and-a-half days, so that the price pressures are 
temporary. 
In the bond market, several studies document price pressures around auctions. Fleming 
and Rosenberg (2007) study the price returns of U.S. treasury bonds on days surrounding the 
auctions, and relate these to the position changes of primary dealers, decomposed into a part 
                                                 
5 A fixed proportion (between 10% and 35%, depending on the type of bond) of the amount offered in each 
auction is reserved for non-competitive supplementary re-openings taking place on the business day after the 
auction. Only “Specialists”, who are dealers selected, and evaluated year-by-year, by the Treasury are allowed to 




related to auctions and a residual part. They document positive yield changes before auctions 
(1 to 1.5 basis points), and negative yield changes after auctions (1 to 2.5 basis points), as a 
result of the auction-driven position changes. They also show that the larger the position 
change, the larger the yield effects. Lou et al. (2013) empirically document that yields in the 
U.S. secondary market increase before auction days and decline again in the days after the 
auction. The effect is quite large and roughly the same for 2, 5 and 10-year maturities, namely 
around 2.5 basis points in a five-day window around the auction. They also document 
spillovers from 10-year bond auctions to the 5-year yield (and less so to the 2-year yield) and 
stronger effects in volatile periods. Forest (2012) adds to this literature by investigating the 
effect of bid-to-cover ratios on U.S. Treasury interest rates during the 1990s. He finds that a 
higher-than-expected bid-to-cover ratio, which indicates strong auction demand, tends to push 
the yield of 5 and 10-year Treasury notes down. Conversely, a lower ratio, indicating a weak 
auction demand, is associated with increased interest rates. 
All this evidence is consistent with the inventory management explanation. 
Nevertheless, there are possible alternative explanations for yield effects around auctions. 
These yield effects could pertain to the primary market, to the secondary market, or both. 
First, auctions may change the supply of treasury bonds. As such, there could be an effect of 
auctions on the interest rates on both outstanding and new debt issues. Moreover, the effect 
should remain for as long as the change in the supply lasts. Krishnamurty and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2012) find a negative effect of the U.S. Treasury bond supply on the difference 
between corporate bond yields and treasury yields.6 Second, with the auction of a new series 
of a given maturity the previous issue of the same maturity goes “off-the-run”, while the new 
series becomes the “on-the-run” series.7 The liquidity of the on-the-run issue is generally 
higher, for example because it is better collateral for repo transactions, and therefore the on-
the-run issue may have a higher price, see Sundaresan (1994). Prices of Treasury securities in 
the cash market may also reflect future specialness in the repo market (Duffie, 1996, and 
Corradin and Maddaloni, 2013). Of course, the two effects are closely related because a part 
of the on-the-run premium is in fact due to the specialness of the on-the-run security (Jordan 
                                                 
6 Further evidence on the yield effects of the supply of treasury securities is provided by Joyce et al. (2011), 
Krishnamurty and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), and d’Amico and King (2013). 
7 The switch to the new on-the-run bond does not necessarily occur on the auction day. For instance, Bloomberg, 
our data source, reports the yield of “bonds and bills selected on the closest current nominal maturity to the 
indicated term”. Whereas for Germany the change in the benchmark bond typically happens on the auction day, 




and Jordan, 1997).8 After the auction announcement, the previous issue loses its “on-the-run” 
status and its yield goes up (see Keane, 1996). Third, the new on-the-run series has a longer 
maturity than the series that goes off-the-run, implying that, with an upward-sloping term 
structure, this pushes up the yield on the new on-the-run series compared to the previous on-
the-run series. 
A key difference between these theories and the inventory theory is that the alternative 
theories all predict persistent or permanent changes in yields after the auction, whereas the 
inventory theory predicts temporary yield effects that are reversed after a few days (an 
‘auction cycle’). We will show strong evidence supporting the reversal. 
 
2.3. A simple model of primary dealer behavior 
 
We present a simple theoretical framework that models the behaviour of primary dealers with 
limited risk-bearing capacity. The model is relevant for the primary market, as suggested by 
the description of the auction processes in the previous subsection. It is also relevant for the 
secondary market, as the group of secondary-market dealers in public debt to a large extent 
coincides with the group of primary dealers. We derive specific predictions about the role of 
volatility and risk aversion and about spill-overs of auctions to secondary-market yields on 
bonds of other maturities. 
Starting point is the model by Ho and Stoll (1983) of oligopolistic dealers who make 
the market in several correlated assets. Assuming a mean-variance utility function, in a one-
period setting the dealers will quote a price Pj (mid-point of bid and ask prices) based on the 
equilibrium (“fundamental”) value Fj of the asset, corrected for the current inventories in all 
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8 Krishnamurthy (2002) shows that the on-the-run premium is highest right after an auction and declines slowly 
towards the new auction. This pattern is precisely what one expects if the on-the-run premium is driven by the 
specialness of the bond, because just before the auction, only a few days of being special remain for the previous 




where ( ),j iCov R R  is the covariance between the returns on the assets i and j, A is the 
coefficient of absolute risk aversion and Ii is the inventory in asset i. Hence, the effect of an 
increase in the inventory of asset i on the price of asset j is given by: 
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where ( )2i iVar Rσ =  is the variance of the return on asset i and jiβ  is the exposure of the return 
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and, hence, is proportional to the variance of asset i. 
This model yields several useful predictions for our ensuing analysis of the bond 
auctions. First, an upcoming auction of a new bond i will lead to a positive inventory position 
in this asset. This will have a negative effect on the price (and, hence, a positive effect on the 
yield) at which the bond can be issued. Second, the larger the issuance size of the auction, the 
larger the inventory and, hence, the larger this price effect, which is equal to 
( )( ) 2/i i i i iP I I A Iσ∂ ∂ ∆ = − ∆ . Third, in the run-up to the auction, the yield on the latest issue of the 
same headline maturity or on a close maturity, which we denote by bond j, will increase, as 
the correlation of the returns on bonds i and j tends to be high, at least at the daily frequency. 
Fourth, the price effect on this bond j will be larger if the amount issued of bond i is larger. 
This effect equals ( )( ) ( )2/ /j i i ji i i ji i i iP I I A I P I Iβ σ β∂ ∂ ∆ = − ∆ = ∂ ∂ ∆ . That is, the cross-price effect 
of an auction in bond i on the price of bond j is equal to the own price effect on bond i 
multiplied by the return exposure of bond j to the return on bond i. 
The crisis manifests itself in two possible specific ways in the effect of an auction on 
the price of the bond. We will explicitly test for these channels. First, when the crisis is more 




auction of bond i on its price and on closely substitutable bonds will be larger. Second, during 
a more severe crisis, primary dealers behave in a more risk-averse way, as captured by a 
higher value of A, and, hence, an auction of a given size also has larger price effects for this 
reason. 
 
3. Data description and key statistics 
 
Our dataset consists of secondary-market daily yields of various maturities, bid-ask spreads, 
futures yields, CDS spreads, repo rates, the Euro OverNight Index Average (EONIA) rate, 
and information on auctions of Treasury bonds for Germany and Italy over (at most) the 
period from 1 January 1999 until 12th February 2013. The information on the auctions is 
collected both from Bloomberg and directly from the countries’ debt agencies. It consists of 
the specific maturity of the new issue, the auction date, the total amount bid, the total amount 
allotted and the average accepted yield at which the debt is sold. The remaining data are all 
from Bloomberg. For secondary-market yields Bloomberg has agreements with a set of 
brokers who report their daily bid prices to Bloomberg, which then publishes an average of 
these prices for their customers. 
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the bond yields on our baseline maturities of 2, 
5 and 10 years. It does so for the full sample period, the “pre-crisis” sub-period up to June 30, 
2007, and the “crisis” sub-period as of July 1, 2007. Over the latter sub-period we observe a 
slight downward trend in the yields on German and Italian debt, although the Italian yields 
occasionally exhibit sharp peaks during this sub-period (not shown). Indeed, the yields have 
become significantly more volatile since mid-2007. 
Table 2 reports some key statistics for the auctions data. The frequency of the Italian 
auctions is higher than that for Germany. Moreover, for Italy the frequency of the 2 and 5-
year auctions is higher during the first than during the second sub-period, while for Germany 
for all three maturities the frequency is higher during the second crisis period. Over the entire 
sample period, the number of auctions of specific maturities ranges from 90 for 5-year 
German debt to 189 for 2-year Italian debt. For the sub-periods, these numbers range from 43 
for 5-year German debt during the first sub-period to 122 for 2-year Italian debt during the 
first sub-period. The total number of Italian auctions exceeds the number of German auctions, 
while Italian auctions are on average smaller, both in terms of the total amounts bid and in 




for by Bloomberg not publishing the non-competitive bids for Italy on the business day after 
the auction.9 As reported by Bloomberg, average total bids in Italian auctions lie in the range 
of 4 – 5 billion and in German auctions in the range of 6 – 15 billion, while average allotted 
amounts lie in the range of 1.8 – 3 billion for Italy and in the range of 5 – 7.5 billion for 
Germany. The average accepted yields at the auctions for Germany lie uniformly below those 
for Italy for any given maturity, although the differences are small during the first sub-period. 
These differences are substantially larger during the second sub-period, with the average 
accepted yield ranging between 1.40% and 2.80% for German debt and between 2.98% and 
4.82% for Italian debt. Finally, Table 2 reports average bid-to-cover ratios, which for the full 
sample period are in the range of 1.5 – 1.8 for Germany and 1.6 – 2.1 for Italy. However, for 
each of the two countries and for all maturities considered, the average bid-to-cover ratios 
have gone down. During the first sub-period, the bid-to-cover ratios are in the ranges of 1.7 – 
2.2 for Germany and 1.8 – 2.4 for Italy, whereas during the second sub-period they are in 
ranges 1.2 – 1.5 for Germany and 1.3 – 1.7 for Italy.  
 
4. Event study analysis 
 
This section presents the results of an event study in which we report the average difference 
between the on-the-run yields during the 5 trading days before and after the auction and the 
yield on the auction day.10 Specifically, following Lou et al. (2013) we report the average of 
0ty y− , where ty  is the end-of-day yield of the on-the-run Treasury bond on day t, and 0y  is 
the end-of-day yield of the same headline maturity (2, 5 and 10-years) bond on the auction 
day.11 We report 90% confidence bands (based on Newey-West adjusted standard errors) 
around these yield differences. Figure 1a shows these movements in basis points for both 
countries for the full sample period. Consistent with Lou et al. (2013) who focus on the U.S. 
Treasury bond market, we find an inverted-V shaped pattern. That is, there is a tendency for 
                                                 
9 For Germany, Bloomberg reports the sum of the competitive and non-competitive bids, whereas for Italy only 
the competitive bids are published. However, the non-competitive supplementary bids are limited to a fixed 
proportion – see Footnote 4. 
10 We limit ourselves to a 10-day window around each auction, because by far most of the movement in the 
yields is concentrated on these days. During the entire window or almost the entire window, the terms and 
conditions of the auction are known. Moreover, by focusing on a relatively narrow window we reduce the risk of 
contamination due to the presence of auctions of other bonds. These potential effects will be controlled for in the 
regression analysis below. 
11 As discussed above, Bloomberg reports the yield on the bond with maturity closest to the headline maturity. 
As a result, the underlying benchmark bond will generally switch within the remaining part of the window after 




yields to increase in the run-up to the auction and to fall once the auction has taken place. For 
Italy these movements are both larger and tend to reach a higher degree of significance than 
for Germany. In the run-up to the auction yields increase by up to 3.5 basis points for five- 
and ten-year debt and by up to almost 3 basis points for two-year debt. For German debt, the 
maximum yield increase is around 2.5 basis points for the five-year debt. Next, we split the 
sample into our two sub-periods. Comparing the before-crisis (Figure 1b) and crisis periods 
(Figure 1c) we observe that for Germany the differences in the movements of the yields 
between the two sub-periods are relatively limited when compared with Italy. For Italy yield 
movements before the crisis are very small and only occasionally significant, while during the 
crisis they are substantially larger and in many instances highly significant. The magnitude of 
the movements ranges from around 6 basis points to around 10 basis points at the limits of the 
window we consider. 
A potential complication is that usually in the days before the auction of a maturity m 
debt instrument Bloomberg reports the yields on the latest issue of this headline maturity, 
while after the auction Bloomberg switches to reporting the yield on the new issue of this 
headline maturity. In other words, for most auctions we are comparing yield movements in 
two different instruments (although usually with maturities very close to each other) around 
the time of the auction. To assess the relevance of this switch of the benchmark bond, for each 
of the headline maturities we explore the yield movements of an instrument with a maturity 
close to the relevant headline maturity. Specifically, we study the yields on the 3-year (6-year, 
9-year) instrument around the issuance dates of the 2-year (5-year, 10-year) instrument. The 
advantage of this approach is that we can explore the yields movements on instruments that 
are kept unchanged as much as possible around the auction dates. Figure 2 shows the results 
of this variation. Both qualitatively and quantitatively, the results are very similar to those 
shown in Figure 1. In particular, by far most of the action is for Italy during the second sub-
period. These findings suggest that the switch after the auction in the instrument for which 
yields are reported has no bearing on our results. 
The combined set of results reported so far casts an interesting perspective on the 
various theoretical explanations for yield movements around auction dates. First, the fact that 
yield movements during the run-up of auctions tend to be fully reversed after the auction 
suggests that the auction cycle is not driven by long-term supply effects. Second, our finding 
of a full auction cycle for close-maturity instruments suggests that both the liquidity effect 




with the repo market are unimportant. Since the close-maturity instrument is not subject to a 
change in benchmark status, the aforementioned liquidity effect cannot be the source of its 
auction cycle. Moreover, a permanent reduction in liquidity would be associated with a 
permanent increase in the yield. Similarly, if the close-maturity bond were to become less 
attractive as collateral, its yield would not revert to its original level. However, our results are 
fully consistent with the above theory of limited risk-bearing capacity of dealers. According 
to this theory the price effects of close-maturity assets, hence assets with similar risk profiles, 
should be similar. 
To further corroborate these results, we also study the effects of auctions on the prices 
of Treasury bond futures. There is an extremely active market for futures on German bonds of 
2, 5 and 10-year maturity. Since 2009, there is also an active market in futures on the 10-year 
Italian bond (there are also more recent markets in 2 and 5 year bond futures, but these are 
less active). Futures contracts are a very efficient hedging vehicle for bond traders. According 
to our inventory model, auctions should therefore also exert price pressure on the futures 
market, but alternative explanations like liquidity and on-the-run effects have no immediate 
predictions for the futures market. Figure 3 shows the price pattern of the Italian and German 
10-year bond futures around the auctions of the Italian and German 10-year bond for the 
period September 15, 2009, the starting date of the futures series on the 10-year Italian debt, 
to February 12, 2013. There is a clear and statistically significant downward price pressure for 
Italy, but no significant effect for Germany. This price pressure is temporary: after the auction 
prices revert to their original levels. These effects are very similar to the effects on the bond 
yields. In terms of magnitude, the auction cycle is around 1% of the price, i.e. a 50 basis 
points downward price movement before the auction and a 50 basis points upwards movement 
after the auction. The futures contracts are written on a notional bond with a 6% coupon. This 
bond’s duration is 7.8 years. Hence, this auction cycle translates into a 13 basis point auction 
cycle in the yield of this notional bond. This is almost exactly the same as the auction cycle in 





5. Regression analysis and interpretation of results 
 
5.1. Regressions with auction dummies 
 
The drawback of an event study analysis is the potential presence of confounding factors 
occurring during the event window. In particular, debt auctions of different maturities 
sometimes take place at the same or a nearby moment. With a regression we can control for 
the role of other relevant variables. For maturity m of country i, we estimate the following 
equation: 
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0 4 4
,  ,i m i m i m i n i mt l t l l t l tl ly c AUC AUC n mα β ε
− −
+ += =
∆ = + + + ≠∑ ∑     (1) 
 
where c0 is a constant, AUC is a dummy that takes a value of 1 (0) when there is an (no) 
auction of the specified country-maturity combination on the indicated date, ε  is a 
disturbance term and n≠m denotes the maturity of another series. Hence, equation (1) links 
daily yield changes to upcoming (l > 0) or past (l < 0) auctions of the same and other (i.e., n ≠ 
m) maturities. We estimate this equation for Germany and Italy and for the maturities of 2, 5 
and 10 years, either setting the β  coefficients to zero or allowing them to be free. We use an 
F-test to test the hypotheses: 
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Similar to the event study of the previous section, we expect that 0
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<∑ . In other words, we test the presence of a full cycle of temporary up and down 
movements in yields as a result of a given auction. 
Table 3 reports the OLS estimates of the magnitude of the auction cycle, 
( ) ( )0 54 1  l ll lα α−= =−−∑ ∑ . The standard errors are Newey-West adjusted. The regression results 
are in line with the results of the event study. For the full sample period and with only the 




Germany the auction cycle is significant only for the 5 and 10-year maturity,12 while for Italy 
at all maturities the level of significance is higher and the sum of the coefficients is about 
double the size of that for Germany. Turning to the sub-periods, we see that the action is 
essentially confined to Italy during the crisis period. In the first sub-period, the only instance 
of significance concerns the German 10-year auction. In the second sub-period, for Germany 
only the 5-year maturity is significant, while for Italy all maturities are (highly) significant. In 
addition, the sizes of the Italian coefficient sums are more than double those for the full 
sample period. For example, for the 2-year maturity the auction cycle is 17 basis points over a 
period of 10 trading days. 
We also test formally whether the magnitudes of the auction cycles differ between 
Germany and Italy. To this end, we estimate (1) as a system simultaneously for the two 
countries and use a Wald test for the null hypothesis that the auction cycles are equally large. 
For the full sample and for the first sub-sample, except in the case of 10-year debt, the 
hypothesis can never be rejected. However, for the second sub-period the hypothesis is 
rejected for all maturities with a p-value of 0.076 for 5-year debt and with a p-value of 0.004 
for 2 and 10-year debt.  
Inclusion of another headline maturity of the same country i (the β coefficients) tends 
to have only a limited effect on the size of the own-maturity coefficients when they are 
significant and does not affect the statistical significance at our standard confidence levels. 
Specifically, the sums of the own-maturity coefficients for Italy during the second sub-period 
remain highly significant and, in fact, this sum even increases substantially for the 2-year 
maturity regression with the 10-year alternative maturity. Except in one instance for Italy 
during the second sub-period, the auction cycle associated with the alternative maturity is 
significant as well as rather substantial in size. 
We have also tested the symmetry of the auction cycle, i.e. the hypothesis that 
5 0
1 4
 l ll lα α
−
=− =
=∑ ∑ . As already discussed above, this test can be used to discriminate the 
hypothesis that the effects of debt auctions are driven by the behaviour of primary dealers 
against the alternative theories we reviewed above, which all predict a permanent effect of 
auctions on secondary market yields. We do not find instances in which the symmetry of the 
auction cycle is rejected, which casts doubt about the relevance of these alternative theories 
for the observed movements in the secondary market yields. 
                                                 





5.2. Regressions with issue size of the auctions 
 
According to our theoretical model, a larger issue implies that primary dealers have to hold a 
larger inventory of the new debt series and, hence, the price movement around the auction 
date will be larger. Hence, we refine baseline regression (1) by replacing the auction dummies 
with the issuance size of the auctions: 
 
5 5, , , , ( ) ,
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where SIZE is the announced (maximum) amount to be issued in billions when there is an 
auction of the specified country-maturity combination on the indicated date. Otherwise, SIZE 
is zero. It is important to recall that the size of the auction is announced well before the 
auction, so that any potential feedback effects of yield movements onto the (maximum) 
amount to be issued are absent. We expect that, if there is any effect of the auction size, the 
effect is positive, because the larger the size of the auction, the more difficult it will be for the 
primary dealers to sell their inventory of the acquired new issue. This is borne out by the 
estimates of ( ) ( )0 54 1  l ll lα α−= =−−∑ ∑ shown in Table 4. Whenever this coefficient sum is 
significant, it is positive. For the full sample regression, for Germany only the 10-year 
maturity yields significance now, while for Italy the coefficient sums are highly significant at 
all maturities and, moreover, they are much larger than in the case of Germany. 
Again, most of the action is in the Italian debt in the second sub-period. To give an 
idea about the magnitude of the effects, for the 2-year maturity an increase by one billion in 
the (maximum) issuance size produces an additional up and down movement in the yield of 
almost 6 basis points. These estimated yield impacts are larger than the estimates for the U.S. 
auctions documented by Fleming and Rosenberg (2007), who report a 0.3 to 0.5 basis point 
yield increase per billion dollars auctioned for the five year U.S. Treasury note. The yield 
impacts can also be compared with the effects of the recent large-scale bond purchases by the 
ECB. Eser and Schwaab (2013) find a yield decrease for Italy of 1.5 basis points per billion 
euros of bond purchases. 
For the regressions with the other maturity included, we see that the coefficient sums 




own maturity combined with the 10-year other maturity, where an increase in the size by one 
billion produces an almost 10 basis points additional yield. 
 
5.3. Probing deeper into the role of the crisis: volatility and risk aversion 
 
The results for Italy in the previous subsections suggest that during the crisis period the 
auction cycle is larger than when there is no crisis. In this subsection we provide additional 
evidence for the effect of the crisis on the auction cycle. 
The crisis manifests itself in increased uncertainty about the yields and/or more risk 
aversion. In line with the theoretical model, we expect the auction cycle to be larger for both 
reasons. As our measure of uncertainty for date t, we construct a volatility measure ,i mtVOL  as 
a moving window over the period (t-30, .., t-1, 0) of the standard deviation of the daily yield 
changes for the maturity m instrument of country i, where past observations are weighed 
along a scheme that declines linearly with the number of days passed. As our measure itCDS  
of risk aversion, we construct an index of the CDS spreads of all primary dealers for country 
i.13 The CDS spread is mainly determined by the product of the probability of default and the 
loss in case of default. One may expect the probability of default to increase with the intensity 
of the crisis, which makes primary dealers more reluctant to take a given position in a new 
debt issue. Hence, they would require a larger return on a position of a given size, so that we 
would expect the auction cycle to be positively correlated with our index of CDS spreads.14 
To investigate the roles of volatility and risk aversion, we estimate: 
 
( )5, , , , ,0 4 ,i m i m i m i m i mt l l t l t l tly c INT AUCα β ε
−
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where ,i mt lINT +  is a variable or vector of variables to be interacted with the auction dummies. 
For ,, , i mi m i mt l t lINT VOL VOL+ += −  we can use our full sample period, while for 
, ii m i
t l t lINT CDS CDS+ += −  the sample period runs from March 8, 2001 until February 12, 2013. 
                                                 
13 Estimates for an index of the top-5 primary dealers turn out to be very similar and will not be separately 
reported. In fact, for Germany the list of top-5 dealers is only available for 2013, so for Germany we have to 
keep the composition of top-5 index constant, while for Italy it may vary from year-to-year as it is available for 
all our sample years. 
14 In a previous version of this paper, we used the KfW-Bund spread constructed by De Santis (2014) as an 
indicator of the severity of the crisis. This gave similar results. However, as VOL and CDS are more directly 




Here, ,i mVOL  and iCDS  are the averages over the auction days of our volatility and CDS 
index. The formulation of the interaction variables in deviations from their averages keeps the 
estimates of the dummy coefficients essentially unaffected. Table 5 presents the estimates. 
When we interact the auction dummies with the volatility index, we see that coefficient sum 
of the interaction term is never significant for Germany, while it is always (highly) significant 
and positive for Italy. This may not be surprising because the variation in volatility is 
substantially smaller for Germany than for Italy during our second sub-sample (see the graph 
in Appendix B.1 – not for publication). The findings indicate that an increase in volatility 
(relative to its average) in the secondary market magnifies the auction cycle for Italy. Figure 4 
depicts for the three maturities under consideration the “total auction cycle”, calculated as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), ,0 5 0 5, ,4 1 4 1ˆ ˆˆ ˆ   i m i mi m i ml l l t l l t ll l l lVOL VOL VOL VOLα α β β− −+ += =− = =− − + − − −  ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ . In particular, for 
the two- and five-year maturities we see at times sharp positive peaks in the size of the 
auction cycle during our second sub-sample, the highest peak occurring around the end of 
2011 when it reaches about 130 basis points for two-year debt. No such peaks are observed 
during our first sub-period. 
Table 5 also reports the estimates when we interact the auction dummies with the CDS 
index, so as to assess the effect of fluctuations in risk-aversion on the auction cycle. Again, 
the effects of including the interaction term are insignificant for Germany, but highly 
significant and positive for Italy for all three maturities, indicating that the Italian auction 
cycle increases when the perceived riskiness of the primary dealers increases. To preserve 
space, we do not depict the total auction cycle. However, in all cases it is similar to that 
shown in Figure 4, though with somewhat smaller peaks. 
Finally, we report in Table 5 also the estimates of the regression when we 
simultaneously include the interactions of the auction dummies with our volatility index and 
the CDS index. Not surprisingly, because the two variables are highly correlated the 
coefficient sums on both of them become insignificant at regular confidence levels. This begs 
the question which variable is the more important one driving the auction cycle. The 
economically more plausible transmission channel is that from market volatility to dealers’ 
CDS spreads, rather than the other way round. Therefore, in order to orthogonalise these two 
factors we regress our CDS index on a constant and our volatility index and include the 
residuals ,i mt lRES +  from this regression simultaneously with the volatility index in equation (4). 




volatility index regain their original significance, while the coefficient sum associated with 
the interaction term with the residuals is always insignificant. These results suggest that it is 
changes in market volatility that are driving the effects of the crisis fluctuations, while 
changes in risk-averse behaviour do not have any distinct additional effect. 
 
5.4. Cross-border spill-overs of auctions 
 
The availability of auction data for two European countries provides us with the possibility to 
investigate whether secondary market yields in one country are affected by auctions in the 
other country and whether these potential spill-overs may be different when the effects of the 
crisis manifest themselves in a more intense way. One hypothesis is that foreign auctions have 
a direct positive effect on domestic secondary market yields, because primary dealers need to 
create room to buy the newly-issued foreign debt, but that this positive effect is mitigated 
when the crisis intensifies, because in that case the primary dealers are less inclined to free up 
space for the new foreign debt issue. Hence, we extend the regression model in the previous 
section to: 
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where ,j mt lAUC +  is the auction dummy for the other country j ≠ i for the same maturity and 
,j m
t lINT +  is again an interaction variable. In line with the previous section we consider for 
,j m
t lINT +  the volatility and CDS indices 
,, j mj m
t lVOL VOL+ − , respectively 
jj
t lCDS CDS+ − . Table 6 
reports the estimates for the maximum available sample period. Extending (4) in the absence 
of a foreign interaction term (i.e., 0lδ =  for all l) has no effect on the original coefficient 
estimates that were reported in Table 5 both in terms of significance and in terms of 
magnitude. Interestingly, there is evidence of an auction cycle in 10-year Italian secondary 
market yields associated with auctions of 10-year German debt, while the magnitude of this 
auction cycle is about two-thirds of the auction cycle associated with domestic debt issues. 
Allowing in addition for a foreign interaction term does not affect this finding. In the case of 
5-year Italian debt the foreign interaction term based on the CDS index has a significantly 
negative coefficient, in line with the above hypothesis. However, this finding has to be 




loans has a significant positive sign. Overall, the evidence of foreign auction spill-overs is 
rather weak, possibly because we have data only for one foreign country rather than all 
countries serviced by the same primary dealers. 
 
5.5. The role of (foreign) end investors 
 
The discussion of the theoretical model in Subsection 2.3 suggests that auction cycles will be 
smaller when it is easier for primary dealers to unload their inventory of the newly issued 
asset. This would be the case when the base of end investors willing to buy the asset is 
broader. Lou et al. (2013) conclude that a large fraction of potential end-investors in U.S. 
public debt are passive investors that do not stand ready to absorb new debt issues, thereby 
contributing to the auction cycle. Data constructed by Arslanalp and Tsuda (2012) indicate 
that the share of foreign holdings of Italian public debt fell from 41% in 2007Q2 to 36% in 
2013Q1, while the share of holdings by foreign banks fell from 14% to 7%. By contrast, over 
the same period the share of German public debt held by foreigners rose from 44% to 56%, 
while the share held by foreign banks fell slightly from 10% to 9%. Appendix B.2 (not for 
publication) graphs these shares. 
The question arises whether the shrinking base of foreign end investors, and in 
particular those of the banking sector, which likely reacts faster to market tensions, helps to 
explain the difference in the auction cycles between Germany and Italy. We extend the 
baseline regression equation (1) with the share of foreign holdings and estimate it over the 
period since 2004Q1 (the period for which the debt data have been constructed). The results 
of these regressions are reported in Appendix B.2 (not for publication). We find that the share 
of foreign holdings enters with a significantly negative coefficient in the case of Italian 2 and 
5-year debt, while the share of foreign bank holdings has a significantly negative coefficient 
for all maturities. By contrast, foreign (bank) holdings of German public debt are never 
significant. However, the negative effect of the foreign (bank) holdings on the size of the 
Italian auction cycle disappears in almost all instances when we extend the more appropriate 










6.1 Do yield movements around auctions constitute excess profit opportunities? 
 
Market participants could try to exploit the secondary-market yield movements around 
auction dates. However, whether these constitute an opportunity to make excess profits 
depends on the transaction costs that need to be overcome and on the volatility of the returns 
on the trading strategy, which is potentially higher around auction dates than during other 
periods. 
Following Lou et al. (2013) we calculate Sharpe ratios for trading strategies involving 
two-, five- and ten-year German and Italian debt around their auction dates. As a concrete 
example, consider the auction of a German five-year bond at date t. Our trader sells a five-
year German bond five days prior to the auction and invests the proceeds in the repo market.15 
On the day of the auction he reverses both transactions. Moreover, he buys a German five-
year bond, while going short on the repo market. Both these latter transactions are reversed 
five days after the auction. We also consider duration-hedged strategies. The duration hedge is 
performed by buying the appropriate amount of ten-year German debt five days prior to the 
auction and by selling sufficient ten-year German debt on auction day. Similarly, for the case 
of a two-year or ten-year debt auction we use domestic five-year debt to hedge the duration. 
Table 7 reports the outcomes of these trading strategies over the full sample period. 
For both countries, the unhedged trading profits are positive for the five-year and ten-year 
bonds, and negative but very close to zero for the two-year bond. The profits are also fairly 
volatile and the annualized Sharpe ratio (assuming one auction per month) of the unhedged 
auction trading strategy for the five-year bond is 0.49. This is smaller than the Sharpe ratio of 
0.84 reported by Lou et al. (2013) for the two-year note in U.S. Treasury auctions (they do not 
                                                 
15 We do not have data on bond prices, but only on bond yields. Therefore, we approximate the change in a bond 
price by (minus) the change in the yield times the duration of the bond. However, we do have bid and ask yields, 
hence we can take account of transaction costs for all transactions, including the duration hedge involved in the 
strategy. That is, we assume that bonds are sold against their bid price and bought against their ask price on the 
relevant date when the transaction takes place. We take account of the financing costs as follows. A long 
position in a particular bond receives the accrued interest, which we assume to be equal to the bond yield, and is 
financed by a repo loan, on which the (country-specific) general collateral repo rate is paid. For a short position 
in a particular bond it is the other way around: accrued interest is paid and the general collateral repo rate is 
received. Bloomberg reports the general collateral repo rates for Italy and Germany from 2006 onward. For the 
earlier years, we use the EONIA rate instead. For all the years from 2006 to 2010, the general collateral repo 
rates for Germany and Italy were very close to EONIA, and most likely these were also very close in the early 




report results for other maturities). The duration-hedged trading profits are smaller than the 
unhedged profits, but also less volatile. For Germany, the duration-hedged average profits are 
slightly positive, but for Italy they are negative. The main reason for the negative duration-
hedged trading profits for Italy is the strong correlation between the yields across maturities. 
Due to this correlation, the duration hedge takes away a large fraction of the auction cycle 
profits. At the same time, the duration-hedged trading strategy incurs transaction costs twice, 
both on the auctioned maturity and the bond used to hedge the duration. 
We also compare the trading profits across the two sub-periods, before and during the 
crisis. The duration-hedged profits are negative before the crisis for both Germany and Italy, 
whereas during the crisis period they become positive for Germany (see Appendix B.3 – not 
for publication). The profits remain negative for Italy over the crisis period despite its much 
stronger auction cycle during that period. The differences between Germany and Italy can be 
explained by the transaction costs: in the case of Italy, transaction costs have increased 
substantially during the crisis, unlike for Germany where transaction costs went down during 
the crisis (see Appendix B.3 – not for publication). 
 
6.2 Debt issuance cost 
 
The observed yield movements surrounding auctions can be exploited to provide an estimate 
of the issuance costs borne by the government. Lou et al. (2013) split the issuance cost into a 
component related to the auction cycle and a component related to the difference between the 
auction yield and the secondary market yield on auction day. Here, we focus only on the first 
component, the additional debt issuance costs that arise purely because of the auction cycle. 
There are two reasons for doing so. The first is that the specific focus of this paper is on the 
auction cycle, while the other reason is that it will be difficult to obtain an accurate estimate 
of the second component, because the Italian Treasury pays the dealers commissions that get 
reflected in the auction yield. In line with Lou et al. (2013) who use the difference between 
the average secondary market yield t periods before and after the auction and the secondary 
market yield on auction day, we use the estimated size of the auction cycle, i.e. the estimate of 
( ) ( )0 54 1  l ll lα α−= =−−∑ ∑ in equation (1) reported in Table 3, divided by two. 
As an example, we focus on 5-year Italian debt to provide a rough calculation of the 




estimated average yield movements are 3.40 basis points for the full sample and 0.75 and 7.74 
basis points for the first and second subsample, respectively. Hence, using the auction data 
from Table 2 we compute for the full sample the average additional issuance cost as an 
additional annual interest payment of 2,546 million (the average amount allotted) times 3.40 
basis points, which is approximately 866,000 euro’s per year. To obtain the cost for the full 
length of the issue we need to multiply this number by the duration of a typical 5-year bond. 
The duration can be calculated as a function of the length of the period between settlement 
date and maturity date, the coupon rate, the frequency of coupon payments and the average 
accepted yield at the auction date. We randomly take three five-year bonds issued in 2006, 
which have an average duration of 4.36 years, and three five-year bonds issued in 2012. These 
have an average duration of 4.52 years. Hence, for the full sample we use an average duration 
of (4.36+4.52)/2 = 4.44 years, implying a total additional cost of almost 3.8 million euros for 
an issue. Assuming that all the currently outstanding debt issued by the Italian Treasury has 
been subject to the same additional issuance cost of 3.40 basis points, the additional annual 
cost to the Treasury is almost 560 million euros (1,640 billion euros times 3.40 basis points).  
Similar calculations for the first subsample yield an additional cost of an issue of about 
710,000 euros, while the additional annual cost associated with a roll-over of the complete 
stock of debt is about 120 million euros. The corresponding figures for the second sub-period 
are 11 million euros, respectively almost 1.3 billion euros. In other words, the additional 
cycle-induced issuance cost increases more than 10-fold going from the pre-crisis to the crisis 
period. 
 
6.3 Auction design 
 
The findings of this paper may also provide some useful, though tentative, leads for 
(sovereign) debt auctioning policies and the design of the underlying auctioning mechanisms. 
First, our evidence regarding the link between the actual crisis intensity and the auction cycle 
suggests that a treasury may want to keep sufficient flexibility regarding the timing of 
auctions so as to limit issuance costs.16 More, and larger, auctions may be scheduled during 
calm periods in the financial markets, and vice versa for turbulent periods in these markets. 
Obviously, funding needs could prevent governments from shifting auction activity over long 
                                                 
16 See the literature on underpricing in auctions by Simon (1994), Damianov et al. (1996), Nyborg and 




periods, but shifts over shorter periods might be possible if the government has arranged for 
access to temporary funding such as credit lines with banks. The data suggest that the crisis 
intensity is sufficiently variable to benefit from a suitable timing of the auctions. 
Second, a related planning problem concerns the size of the new debt issue. Our earlier 
estimates already indicated that for Italy during the crisis period the auction cycle was 
positively related to the issuance size. This means that smaller, but more frequent, auctions 
are likely to reduce total issuance costs. Turning back to Table 2, it is remarkable that going 
from the first to the second sub-period, Germany has rather drastically increased the average 
monthly frequency of its auctions, while at the same time having reduced the average issuance 
size. By contrast, Italy has even slightly reduced the frequency of its auctions, while at the 
same time having rather drastically increased the average issuance size. It may well be that 
the increase in the issuance size at times when the demand for periphery debt was under 
pressure has contributed to Italy’s auction cycle. To investigate the matter further, we estimate 
the specification in (4) with the interaction variable ,, , i mi m i mt l t lINT BC BC+ += − , where BC denotes 
the bid-to-cover ratio when there is an auction of the specified country-maturity combination 
on the indicated date. Further, BC  is the average bid-to-cover ratio in our sample. The results 
reported in Table 8 show that the coefficient sum on the bid-to-cover ratio tends to be 
significantly negative. This indicates that, while an upcoming auction leads to a rise in the 
yield, a larger bid-to-cover ratio reduces the effect on the yield. Obviously, a government does 
not have perfect control over the bid-to-cover ratio, because it has little direct control over the 
demand for its debt, while the supply is to a large extent determined by immediate financing 
needs. Nevertheless, a government may still want to create some flexibility regarding the 
latter, so that, when it picks up signals that the demand for a new debt issue might be low, it 
can shift some of the new supply to a moment in the future when demand is likely to be 
higher. 
Third, the virtual absence of an auction cycle for Germany even during the crisis 
period suggests that other differences in auctioning policies as well as differences in the 
design of the auctions may play a role in explaining the differences in the auction cycle 
between the two countries. To investigate whether this may indeed be the case, we 
simultaneously re-estimate equation (4) with ,, , i mi m i mt l t lINT VOL VOL+ += −  as a system for Germany 
and Italy and formally test whether the relevant coefficient sums are equal for the two 
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superscript G (I) denotes Germany (Italy), is rejected for 2- and 5-year debt at the 1% 
significance level and for 10-year debt at the 5% level. Repeating the tests for 
, ii m i
t l t lINT CDS CDS+ += −  for the maximum available sample period March 8, 2001 – February 
12, 2013 yields rejections at the 1% level for all three maturities. Inspection of the tests of the 
individual restrictions shows that the rejections of the joint hypothesis are mainly driven by 
the differences between the two countries in their responses to our crisis intensity measures. 
Differences in auction design and policy potentially contribute to these different 
responses. As documented in Section 2, an important difference between German and Italian 
auctions is that the supply in German auctions is variable, while in Italian auctions until not 
too long ago it was fixed before the auction. In contrast to Germany, even during the periods 
since it changed the design of its auctions Italy has made only very limited use of its 
discretion over the eventual supply. Table 9 shows that Germany has on average withheld 
between 18 and 20% of its announced maximum allotment, while Italy has on average 
withheld only between 1 and 3% of the announced maximum. A reason may be that during 
the crisis period the Italian Treasury was under such a financial pressure that it was effectively 
unable exert its discretion. 
Back and Zender (2001) suggest that a uniform-price auction with fixed supply 
performs worse from the seller’s perspective than one in which the supply may be restricted 
ex-post. Hence, in the current context a possible hypothesis is that a policy of exploiting a 
design that allows part of the new debt supply to be withheld depending on the success of the 
auction, may limit the fall in the new asset’s price. Anticipating this, market participants may 
have a weaker incentive to bid down secondary market prices and the auction cycle may not 
come into existence. Exploiting this feature of the auction design may be particularly 
rewarding at times of stress in the financial markets. The hypothesis is consistent with the 
extensive use that the German Treasury has made of its discretion to regulate the supply at 
auctions and the absence of such discretion for the Italian Treasury during large parts of our 
sample period and its limited use of this discretion during the rest of the sample. It is also 
consistent with the fact that the U.S. features a clear auction cycle, as shown by Lou et al. 
(2013), while the supply of its new debt is fixed in advance.17  
                                                 
17 The website of the U.S. Treasury (2014) mentions “At the close of an auction, Treasury awards all 




Obviously, on the basis of the results so far one needs to be careful not to draw too 
strong conclusions about how auction design and policies affect the auction cycle, given that 
we have not been able to control at the same time for other factors, such as the much deeper 
and liquid futures markets for German (than for Italian) debt. These may allow primary 
dealers to hedge against the inventory risk, thereby also dampening yield movements in the 
cash market. 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
 
We have explored the relationship between public debt auctions and secondary-market yields 
and how this relationship is affected by the recent financial crisis. While secondary-market 
yields on Italian public debt increase in anticipation of an auction, no or a smaller such effect 
is found for German public debt. The yield movements on Italian debt are essentially confined 
to the period starting mid-2007. Further analysis shows that the auction cycle is positively 
related to volatility and risk-bearing capacity measures as proxies for the intensity of the 
crisis, with volatility likely being the more important measure. Overall, our results suggest a 
significant role for the crisis in determining this relationship. Moreover, they are consistent 
with our simple theoretical framework in which a small group of primary dealers require 
compensation for inventory risk, while this compensation needs to be higher when market 
uncertainty and risk aversion are larger. We also find that the secondary-market behaviour of 
debt for which there is no auction, but with a maturity close to that of the auctioned series, is 
very similar to the secondary-market behaviour of the auctioned maturity. This finding 
supports the primary-dealer model relative to other explanations based on liquidity effects. 
Our results also allowed us to make a rough assessment of the additional issuance cost 
associated with the auction cycle. For an Italian five-year bond during the crisis period, we 
calculated these costs for an issue at almost 11 million euros and for a complete roll-over of 
the outstanding debt at almost 1.3 billion euros. Both figures constitute a more-than-10-fold 
increase relative to the pre-crisis period. Although secondary-market yields move appreciably 
around auctions, these movements seem insufficient to develop profitable trading strategies 
that overcome their associated transactions costs and the increase in market volatility during 
                                                                                                                                                        
their rate, yield, or discount margin (lowest to highest) until the quantity of awarded bids reaches the offering 




the run-up to an auction. Even so, there may be timing opportunities for parties that for 
exogenous reasons are forced to trade. 
Finally, our findings suggest that specific choices regarding the design of the auction 
mechanism and the policies followed by the Treasury may matter for the auction cycle and the 
debt issuance costs. For example, even after controlling for our indicators of the crisis 
intensity, the German and Italian auction cycles differ significantly. Remarkably, Germany 
makes extensive use of the possibility to withhold part of the new debt issue if this is 
warranted, while Italy until recently did not have the discretion to do this and, once it allowed 
itself this discretion, it hardly made use of it. However, such observations remain only 
suggestive, as other differences, such as in the development of alternative hedging markets, 
may also contribute to explaining differences in auction cycles. Treasuries may benefit greatly 
from future research exploring in more detail which policies and design elements contribute to 
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Table 1: Means and standard deviations of daily yield changes 
 Germany Italy 
 2-year 5-year 10-year 2-year 5-year 10-year 
Mean (in basis points) 
Before crisis 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.04 
Crisis -0.29 -0.26 -0.20 -0.19 -0.09 -0.02 
Equality test  0.02 0.06 0.13 0.36 0.55 0.76 
Standard deviation (in basis points) 
Before crisis 4.09 4.37 3.85 4.10 4.36 3.90 
Crisis 5.31 5.77 5.35 12.28 10.44 8.02 
Equality test  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Notes: This table reports the means and standard deviations of the 2, 5 and 10-year government bond yield 
changes of Germany and Italy. Data cover the period January 1, 1999 – February 12, 2013. “Before crisis” refers 
to the period January 1, 1999 – June 30, 2007, while “Crisis” refers to the period July 1, 2007 – February 12, 
2013. The “Equality test” reports the p-value of the F-test of equality of means, respectively variances. 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics for the auctions  
 Germany Italy 
 2-year 5-year 10-year 2-year 5-year 10-year 
 Full sample period 
Number of auctions 114 90 104 189 168 166 
Av. amount bid (mil.) 11,663 9,145 9,378 4,296 4,221 4,276 
Av. amount allotted (mil.) 6,465 5,856 6,462 2,179 2,546 2,772 
Av. bid-to-cover ratio 1.817 1.568 1.451 2.140 1.752 1.584 
Av. accepted yield (%) 2.27 2.82 3.55 3.24 3.99 4.67 
 January 1, 1999 – June 30, 2007 
Number of auctions 55 43 52 122 105 95 
Av. amount bid (mil.) 14,747 11,461 12,164 4,100 4,096 4,326 
Av. amount allotted (mil.) 6,927 6,535 7,500 1,826 2,183 2,489 
Av. bid-to-cover ratio 2.188 1.772 1.674 2.403 1.949 1.767 
Av. accepted yield (%) 3.20 3.74 4.31 3.38 4.03 4.55 
 July 1, 2007 – February 12, 2013 
Number of auctions 59 47 52 67 63 71 
Av. amount bid (mil.) 8,751 7,026 6,591 4,655 4,428 4,210 
Av. amount allotted (mil.) 6,034 5,234 5,423 2,821 3,150 3,149 
Av. bid-to-cover ratio 1.472 1.382 1.228 1.659 1.424 1.339 
Av. accepted yield (%) 1.40 1.97 2.80 2.98 3.94 4.82 
 
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the auctions of 2, 5 and 10-year government bonds of Germany 
and Italy. Data cover the period January 1, 1999 – February 12, 2013. In the table, “Av.” = “average”, “mil.” = 
“million”. The average amount allotted refers to the announced (maximum) issue size, which in the case of 
Germany includes also the amount retained by the Treasury for secondary market operations. The bid-to-cover 





Table 3: Estimates of auction effects on yields  
 
 Germany Italy 
 2-year 5-year 10-year 2-year 5-year 10-year 
 Full sample period 
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 July 1, 2007 – February 12, 2013 

































Notes: (i) This table reports estimates of equation (1),  
5 5, , , , ( ) ,
0 4 4
,i m i m i m i n m i mt l t l l t l tl ly c AUC AUCα β ε
− − ≠
+ += =
∆ = + + +∑ ∑  where AUC is the dummy for the day of the auction. 
The table reports, in basis points, the estimated sums of the coefficients 0 5
4 1
 l ll lα α
−
= =−
−∑ ∑ for “Dummy own” 
(the maturity-country combination in the header) and 0 5
4 1l ll l
β β−
= =−
−∑ ∑  for “Dummy 2-year”, “Dummy 5-year” 
and “Dummy 10-year”. (ii) Significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. (iii) 





Table 4: Estimates of the effects of the issue size on the auction cycle 
 Germany Italy 
 2-year 5-year 10-year 2-year 5-year 10-year 
 Full sample period 
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Notes: (i) This table reports estimates of equation (3), 
5 5, , , , ( ) ,
0 4 4
  ,i m i m i m i n m i mt l t l l t l tl ly c SIZE SIZEα β ε
− − ≠
+ += =
∆ = + + +∑ ∑ where SIZE denotes the announced (maximum) issue 
size. The table reports, in basis points per billion euros, the estimated sums of the coefficients 
0 5
4 1
 l ll lα α
−
= =−
−∑ ∑ for “Size own” (the maturity-country combination in the header) and 0 54 1l ll lβ β
−
= =−
−∑ ∑  for 
“Size 2-year”, “Size 5-year” and “Size 10-year”, the announced (maximum) issue size of the relevant other 
maturity. (ii) Significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. (iii) Estimation method 





Table 5: Testing the role of volatility and risk aversion 
 
 Germany Italy 
 2-year 5-year 10-year 2-year 5-year 10-year 
Dummy 




























Dummy ( ),,*  i mi mt lVOL VOL+ −  


























Dummy ( ),,*  i mi mt lVOL VOL+ −  

























Notes: (i) This table reports estimates of equation (4), ( )5, , , , ,0 4 ,i m i m i m i m i mt l l t l t l tly c INT AUCα β ε
−
+ +=
∆ = + + +∑  where 
AUC denotes the dummy for the day of the auction and ,i m
t lINT +  denotes an interaction variable, which can be our 
volatility measure ,, i mi m
t lVOL VOL+ − , our CDS index 
ii
t lCDS CDS+ − , or the residual ,i mt lRES +  of the linear 
regression of our CDS index on our volatility measure. It reports, in basis points, the estimated sum of the 
coefficients 0 5
4 1l ll l
α α−
= =−
−∑ ∑ for “Dummy”, i.e. the auction dummy for the maturity-country combination in the 
header, and 0 5
4 1
 l ll lβ β
−
= =−
−∑ ∑  for the interaction term of the dummy and ,i mt lINT + . (ii) Sample period is the full 
sample period January 1, 1999 – February 12, 2013 or March 8, 2001 – February 12, 2013, when ii
t lCDS CDS+ −  
or ,i m
t lRES +  are used. (iii) Significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level is denoted by 
*, ** and ***, respectively. (iv) 




Table 6: Cross-border spill-overs of auctions 
 
 Germany Italy 
 2-year 5-year 10-year 2-year 5-year 10-year 
Dummy own 



























Dummy own ( ),,*  i mi mt lVOL VOL+ −  
Dummy foreign 



























































Dummy own ( )* iit lCDS CDS+ −  
Dummy foreign 































Notes: (i) This table reports estimates of equation (5),  
( ) ( )5 5, , , , , , ,0 4 4 ,  ,i m i m i m i m j m j m i mt l l t l t l l l t l t l tl ly c INT AUC INT AUC j iα β γ δ ε
− −
+ + + += =
∆ = + + + + + ≠∑ ∑  where the variables 
are defined in the Notes to Table 5 and where superscript j denotes the foreign country. The table reports, in 
basis points, the estimated sums of the coefficients 0 5
4 1l ll l
α α−
= =−
−∑ ∑ , 0 54 1l ll lβ β
−
= =−
−∑ ∑ , 0 54 1l ll lγ γ
−
= =−
−∑ ∑  and 
0 5
4 1l ll l
δ δ−
= =−
−∑ ∑ associated with, respectively, the domestic auction dummy “Dummy own”, its interaction with 
,i m
t lINT + , the foreign auction dummy “Dummy foreign”, and its interaction with ,j mt lINT + . (ii) Sample period is the 
full sample period January 1, 1999 – February 12, 2013 or March 8, 2001 – February 12, 2013, when 
ii
t lCDS CDS+ −  is used. (iii) Significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level is denoted by 
*, ** and ***, respectively. (iv) 
Estimation method is ordinary least squares (OLS) with Newey-West adjusted standard errors. (v) “Dummy 





Table 7: Trading profits 
 
 Germany Italy 
 2-year 5-year 10-year 2-year 5-year 10-year 
Unhedged 
Mean -0.018 0.092 0.179 -0.016 0.150 0.264 
Standard deviation 0.287 0.797 1.050 0.579 1.067 1.542 
Annualized Sharpe ratio -0.22 0.40 0.59 -0.10 0.49 0.59 
Duration hedged 
Duration-hedged Mean -0.001 0.012 0.094 -0.161 -0.127 -0.550 
Standard deviation 0.169 0.329 0.516 0.294 0.445 1.045 
Annualized Sharpe ratio -0.02 0.13 0.63 -1.90 -0.99 -1.82 
Notes: (i) The table reports means, standard deviations and annualized Sharpe ratios for the excess returns (in 
percent) after payment of transaction costs of our trading strategy around auctions of two-year debt (Columns “2-
year”), five-year debt (Columns “5-year”) and ten-year debt (Columns “10-year”) over the full sample period. The 
first panel reports the results for the unhedged trading strategy, the second panel for the duration-hedged strategy. 
Transactions in five-year debt are hedged with domestic ten-year debt, and transactions in two-year and ten-year 
debt are hedged with domestic five-year debt. (ii) Sample period is the full sample period January 1, 1999 – 




Table 8: Estimates of the effect of the bid-to-cover ratio on the auction cycle 
 Germany Italy 
 2-year 5-year 10-year 2-year 5-year 10-year 















Notes: (i) This table reports estimates of equation (4), ( )5, , , , ,0 4 ,i m i m i m i m i mt l l t l t l tly c INT AUCα β ε
−
+ +=
∆ = + + +∑  where 
AUC denotes the dummy for the day of the auction and ,, , i mi m i m
t l t lINT BC BC+ += − , where BC is the bid-to-cover 
ratio and BC  is its sample average. It reports, in basis points, the estimated sum of the coefficients 
0 5
4 1l ll l
α α−
= =−
−∑ ∑ for “Dummy”, i.e. the auction dummy for the country-maturity combination in the header, and 
0 5
4 1
 l ll lβ β
−
= =−
−∑ ∑ for “BC”, i.e. the bid-to-cover ratio for the country-maturity combination in the header. (ii) 
Sample period is the full sample period January 1, 1999 – February 12, 2013. (iii) Significance at the 10, 5 and 1% 
level is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. (iv) Estimation method is ordinary least squares (OLS) with 
Newey-West adjusted standard errors. 
 
 
Table 9: Fraction of announced maximum supply withheld 
Germany Italy 
2-year 5-year 10-year 2-year 5-year 10-year 
January 1, 1999 – June 30, 2007 
13.79 17.72 17.05 - - - 
Germany: July 1, 2007 – February 12, 2013; 
Italy: December 1, 2011 - February 12, 2013 for 2-year maturity; 
October 1, 2008 - February 12, 2013 for 5- and 10-year maturity 
17.23 18.23 19.94 3.06 1.40 1.19 
Note: The table reports, in percent, the fraction of the announced maximum supply that is withheld by the 
Treasury during the period when the Treasury had the discretion to do this. The German Treasury had this 





Figure 1: Yield movements before and after auctions  
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Notes: The figure reports the average of 0ty y− , where ty  is the end-of-day yield of the Treasury bond on day t, 
and 0y  is the end-of-day yield on the same maturity bond on the auction day 0. All yields are expressed in basis 





Figure 2: Yield movements around auctions – close maturities  
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Notes: The figure reports the average yield movements of the 3-year bond around auctions of 2-year debt, of the 
6-year bond around auctions of the 5-year debt and the 9-year bond around auctions of the 10-year debt. Further, 
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Notes: The figure reports the average movements of the (log of) prices of futures on 10-year bonds around 
auctions of 10-year debt. The sample period runs from September 15, 2009 to February 12, 2013. Further, see 
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Appendix A: Background information on auction procedures 
 
A.1. Germany 
The GFA auctions Treasury discount paper (6 and 12-month maturity “Bubills”), Federal 
Treasury notes (2-year maturity “Schätze”), five-year Federal notes (“Bobls”) and Federal 
bonds (10 and 30-year maturity “Bunds”).18 The procedure to place the individual issues in a 
year t is standardized as follows – see Figure A.1. Towards the end of the preceding year the 
annual preview and the issuance calendar are published. Further, towards the end of the 
month preceding a new quarter the new calendar for the coming quarter is published. Then, 
six trading days before each auction there is an announcement of the maturity, the issue size 
and time schedule of the auction, while a press release inviting the members of the Bund 
Issues Auction Group to submit their bids is sent out one working day before the auction. 
Figure A.1: German Auction Procedure 
 
Source: http://www.deutsche-finanzagentur.de/en/institutional/primary-market/auction-procedure/. 
                                                 
18 Other financial instruments of the Federal Government include inflation-linked Federal notes (five-year 
Bobl/ei), inflation-linked Federal bonds (10-year Bund/ei), foreign currency bonds, special securitized loans 







The Italian Treasury issues, on the domestic market, four main categories of government 
bonds: Treasury bills (“BOTs” with a 3, 6, and 12-month maturity or with a flexible maturity 
between 1 and 12 months), zero-coupon Treasury bonds (24-month maturity “CTZs”), 
Treasury certificates (5 or 7-year maturity “CCTs”/”CCTs-eu” with a semi-annual floating 
coupon) and Treasury bonds (3, 5, 10, 15 and 30-year maturity “BTPs”).19 Towards the end of 
each year, the Ministry publishes the auctions calendar for the following year. This is 
followed by the publication of a quarterly issuance programme. The terms and conditions of 
an auction are published roughly one week before the auction. The “Authorized Dealers” that 
are allowed to participate in the auction are Italian and foreign banks, financial brokers and 
EU and non-EU investment companies registered at the Bank of Italy (Italian Treasury, 
2014b).20 
                                                 
19 The Ministry also issues Treasury bonds linked to euro-zone inflation (3, 5, 10, 15 and 30-year maturity 
“BTPs €i”) and to Italian inflation (“BTPs Italia”). Other instruments typically offered on international markets 
include medium/long-term securities or commercial paper in euros and in other currencies.  
20 Each dealer can submit a maximum of three bids. In order for the accepted yields to be in line with the market 
yields, a minimum acceptable yield, also called the safeguard yield, is calculated. Similarly, a maximum 





Appendix B: Further results 
(NOT for publication – available upon request) 
 
B.1. Plot of volatility measure 
 
Below we depict our volatility measure for Germany and Italy for each of the maturities 
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B.2. Figures and results for regressions with (foreign) end investors. 
 
The figures below show (total) foreign holdings of public debt, respectively foreign bank 
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SBH_DE SBH_IT  
Notes: SFH_DE (SFH_IT) = total foreign holdings as a fraction of outstanding German (Italian) public debt, 






The first regression generalises model (1) to 
 
( )5, , , , ,0 4 ,i m i m i m i m i mt l l t l t l tly c INT AUCα β ε
−
+ +=
∆ = + + +∑  
 
where ,, , i mi m i mt l t lINT SFH SFH+ += −  (
,, , i mi m i m
t l t lINT SBH SBH+ += −  ) is the share of foreign (foreign 
bank) holdings of Germany’s or Italy’s public debt of maturity m in deviation from its sample 
average. The estimates are over the period 2004Q1 – 2013Q1. The debt data are quarterly and 
we apply linear interpolation to obtain holdings shares at the daily frequency (substituting the 
same holdings number for each day of a quarter yields results that are practically identical). 
The second regression equation generalises model (4) to: 
 
( )5, , , , , ,0 1, 2,4 ,i m i m i m i m i m i mt l l t l l t l t l tly c INT INT AUCα β γ ε
−
+ + +=
∆ = + + + +∑  
 
where ,, ,1,
i mi m i m
t l t lINT VOL VOL+ += −  or ,1,
ii m i
t l t lINT CDS CDS+ += −  and 
,, ,
2,
i mj m i m
t l t lINT SFH SFH+ += −  or 
,, ,
2,
i mj m i m
t l t lINT SBH SBH+ += − . The estimates of these regressions are in Table B.1, which has the 
same structure as Table 5. Hence, the notes to Table 5 apply. 
 
Table B.1: Testing the role of foreign debt holdings 
 Germany Italy 
 2-year 5-year 10-year 2-year 5-year 10-year 
Dummy 
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B.3. Trading profits and bid-ask spreads over the sub-samples. 
 
Table B.2 reports the profits of duration-hedged trading strategies for the two sub-periods. 
When perceived market uncertainty increases, bond dealers increase their bid-ask spreads to 
reduce the chances of a loss on their positions. Hence, in line with our theoretical model, 
enhanced bid-ask spreads should coincide with larger auction cycles. Table B.3 reports for 
five and ten-year public debt the average bid-ask spread, calculated using the approximation 
(PA- PB)/P ≈ D (yB- yA), where PA and PB are the ask and bid price, respectively, P is the 
average of the two, yA and yB are the ask and bid yields, respectively, and D is the duration. 
For each country, each maturity and each sub-period we calculate the average duration for 
three arbitrarily chosen bonds and use this to calculate the bid-ask spread. We see that for 
given maturity the average bid-ask spreads are always larger for Italy than for Germany. 
While for Germany the average bid-ask spread falls when going from the first to the second 
sub-period, exactly the opposite is seen for Italy, where the average bid-ask spread roughly 
doubles. This finding is consistent with the increase in the size of Italy’s auction cycle when 
going from the first to the second sub-period. The estimates of the bid-ask spread for the 
Italian bonds are somewhat smaller than the estimates in Pelizzon et al. (2013), but their 
sample period covers the most volatile part of the crisis. 
 
Table B.2: Average duration-hedged trading profits for sub-samples 
 Germany Italy 
January 1, 1999 – June 30, 2007 
 2-year 5-year 10-year 2-year 5-year 10-year 
Mean -0.090 -0.113 -0.046 -0.118 -0.121 -0.259 
Standard deviation 0.095 0.267 0.404 0.189 0.251 0.400 
Annualized Sharpe ratio -3.28 -1.47 -0.39 -2.16 -1.67 -2.24 
July 1, 2007 – February 12, 2013 
 2-year 5-year 10-year 2-year 5-year 10-year 
Mean 0.080 0.109 0.162 -0.201 -0.126 -0.812 
Standard deviation 0.182 0.334 0.568 0.384 0.646 1.454 
Annualized Sharpe ratio 1.52 1.13 0.99 -1.81 -0.68 -1.93 
Note: the table reports means, standard deviations and annualized Sharpe ratios for the excess returns (in percent) 
after transaction costs of our duration-hedged trading strategy around auctions of two-year debt (Columns “2-
year”), five-year debt (Columns “5-year”) and ten-year debt (Columns “10-year”) over the two sub-sample 
periods. Transactions in the five-year bond are hedged with the domestic ten-year bond, and transactions in the 






Table B.3: Average bid-ask spreads 
Germany Italy 
2-year 5-year 10-year 2-year 5-year 10-year 
January 1, 1999 – June 30, 2007 
0.055 0.053 0.073 0.063 0.058 0.078 
July 1, 2007 – February 12, 2013 
0.012 0.014 0.036 0.106 0.125 0.142 
Note: the table reports bid-ask spreads as an approximated percentage of the price of the bond. 
